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Greece has submitted new proposals to its creditors in an attempt to ﬁnally end the deadlock over
the release of further bailout funding. Stephanie J. Rickard writes that the present impasse could
have been avoided if the strategy pursued by the International Monetary Fund in previous loan
programmes to other countries had been repeated. Drawing on a study of democratic countries
under IMF programmes, she notes that the IMF has typically relaxed loan programme requirements
in the leadup to elections. By failing to do so in the Greek case, the foundations were set for Syriza
to come to power on an anti-austerity platform, making a compromise far more diﬃcult.
With no deal reached between Greece and its creditors despite months of negotiations over the release of further
ﬁnancial assistance, the country opted to delay a €300 million debt repayment to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) that was due on 5 June. The Greek government now intends to bundle together several payments totalling
€1.6 billion into a single payment due on 30 June, while fresh proposals have been communicated to creditors in an
attempt to secure additional bailout funding.
This impasse could have been avoided. The IMF, an
institution that for decades has loaned money to
countries in distress, successfully sidestepped
Greece-like drama in the past. The IMF
accomplished this by relaxing the reforms required of
borrowers in the run up to elections. In a recent
study, I and my co-author Teri Caraway, ﬁnd the IMF
softened mandated labour market reforms in loans
negotiated within six months of a pending election.
The further away elections were, the more stringent
the reforms required in exchange for ﬁnancing.
The IMF typically softens required reforms prior to
elections to avoid precisely the situation now playing
out in Greece. Tough reforms give opposition parties
ammunition to use against the government and
increase the chances that the incumbent parties will
lose. In Greece, the painful austerity policies
demanded by international lenders resulted in a
series of convulsive protests that shook the nation
and ultimately led to the election of a new anti-austerity government under Syriza in place of the previous New
Democracy-led government fronted by Antonis Samaras.
Newly elected governments feel little obligation to abide by the terms of an existing loan agreement. Following the
1987 elections in Argentina, for example, the new Peronist-dominated Congress tried to undermine the
government’s reforms, especially those at the heart of the IMF loan programme. The resulting policy paralysis
contributed to the collapse of the IMF programme.
In Greece, the newly elected government led by Syriza’s Alexis Tsipras sought to re-negotiate the terms of their loan
programme. If the ‘Troika’ of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF had dialled back
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the required reforms prior to the 2015 Greek election, things might be very diﬀerent today. Syriza may not have won
oﬃce and the ensuing stalemate that has crippled the country may have been avoided.
Yet, few attempts were made to soften the requisite reforms prior to the 2015 election. We can only speculate as to
why. One possibility is that the IMF suggested toning down the reforms but was overruled by the European
Commission and the European Central Bank. In our study, all of the loans we examined were made by the IMF
alone – unaccompanied by other institutions, like the European Central Bank or European Commission. Perhaps
the dynamics of the Troika have led to diﬀerent lending practices. Of course, we do not know what went on behind
closed doors so we can only speculate about the internal dynamics of the Troika.
The IMF has a history of lending to countries in crisis and as the “lender of last resort” for decades the Fund has
presumably discovered expedient negotiating and lending strategies. The European Commission and European
Central Bank would be wise to take note, particularly of the importance of democratic elections, which inﬂuence not
only national politics but also the international economy.
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